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The expansion of school choice and greater competition between schools is currently 
the centrepiece of government educational policy in the UK. There is an increasing 
emphasis on parents’ right to choose their preferred schools, and whilst many parents 
may value choice itself, the advocates of these market oriented reforms usually argue 
that the main benefits are to force educational providers to improve standards. In this 
study we look to see whether we can find any empirical foundation for these claims 
amongst the primary school population in the south east of England. 
Our key findings are that 
•  Pupils who have a wider choice of schools at their place of residence 
perform no better than those with more limited choice 
•  Secular schools located in places where they face strong competition from 
other schools perform no better than secular schools in more isolated, 
monopolistic settings 
•  Church schools seem to respond more positively to competition, particularly 
from other church schools. We have some evidence to show that pupils in 
more isolated church schools perform less well than those in competitive 
church school ‘markets’. 
•  The benefits of competition seem strongest amongst pupils in church 
schools with the highest concentrations of low-income children 
•  On balance, choice and competition does not seem to be generally effective 
in raising standards in the school context 
   Although the issue has been widely researched, especially in the US, existing 
evidence on the beneficial effects of competition on educational achievements is at best 
mixed, and does not provide a solid ground for policy conclusions. We use a large 
administrative census of primary school pupils in London and the surrounding area. 
This allows us to improve on the existing literature along two dimensions. 
First, exploiting pupil residential details and information on school location, we 
construct separate choice and competition indices and study their impact on pupil 
attainment. Choice is a property of pupil residential location, and depends on the 
schools from which a family can feasibly choose. Competition is a property of schools, 
and depends on the number of institutions competing for the same pool of pupils. 
Secondly, we make use of the fact that institutional barriers limit school 
attendance outside the Local Education Authority (LEA) of residence and that, as a 
result, very few pupils cross district boundaries to attend primary school. Because of 
this, pupils near LEA boundaries face less choice and schools near LEA boundaries 
tend to face less competition. We can use this feature of the admissions system to help 
solve the difficult issues of reverse causation arising from the fact that school 
performance may influence the patterns of choice and competition that we observe. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
Choice has been the big policy idea in education for quite some time, and it is an idea 
that is increasingly being pushed hard in the UK. Choice may be a good thing in itself 
because people value their freedom; but most proponents argue that it leads educational 
providers to compete for pupils by improving their technology and raising educational 
standards. The issue has been widely researched in the US, with an extensive literature 
in the education and economics of education fields (Hoxby, 2003, 2004a). However, it 
seems only fair to say that the existing evidence is mixed, and at best offers a shaky 
foundation for policy. 
Despite this, a quasi-market in education has political currency.
1 In this paper we 
study school choice and competition, with the aim of trying to uncover empirical 
evidence for the hypothesised performance advantages that advocates of choice and 
competition say underpin these policy ideas. We build on methods used before in the 
US literature to measure the effects of choice availability and competitive pressures on 
primary school achievement in the South East of England. Our data allows us to 
improve on the existing literature since it contains detailed information on pupil and 
school addresses, from which we can construct separate choice and competition indices.  
                                                 
1 See Le Grand (1991, 1993) and the more recent discussion in Machin and Vignoles (2005). In the recent 
2005 UK government election, the two leading parties both supported it in their manifestos. Labour’s 
pledged was that ‘good schools will be able to expand their size and also their influence – by taking over 
less successful schools’ (Labour Party, 2005a). The Conservatives pledged a right to choose that ‘will 
give real autonomy to all schools, and real choice to parents’, with the claim that ‘choice drives up 
standards in every field of human endeavour [and]… put pressure on underperforming schools to raise 
their standards’ (Conservative Party, 2005). 
 
  1  We also make use of the fact that only a small percentage of pupils in England 
attend primary schools outside their home Local Education Authority (LEA) because 
there are institutional barriers to doing so. This allows us to derive credible instrumental 
variables for the competition and choice indices, based on the boundary discontinuity 
these barriers generate.  We use this empirical strategy to solve the difficult issues of 
reverse causation that are inextricably associated with studying connections between 
pupil performance and choice/competition. 
In the empirical analysis, simple least squares regressions show there to be a 
positive, but small, association between pupil performance and competition indices. 
Yet, this seems to be related to endogenous school location or pupil sorting since the 
instrumental variables estimates show few gains to be had from improving pupil choice 
and school competition. Indeed, it is only in faith schools that competition seems to be 
positively and causally linked to performance, and even then only in terms of their 
competitive position in relation to other faith schools.  
The next section of the paper outlines the ideas surrounding debates on choice and 
competition, explains how these relate to the current admissions system in England, and 
provides a short guide to the (vast) empirical evidence from the US and the (scant) 
empirical evidence from elsewhere. Following that, in Section 3 we explain our 
empirical methods, Section 4 describes the data and Section 5 presents our results. 




  2  2.  School Competition and Choice: Theoretical Background, Previous Research 
and the Case of English Primary Schools 
 
2.1 The costs and benefits of school choice 
Theoretical discussions of the benefits of school choice and competition, and on its less 
desirable consequences, are wide ranging and often highly politicised. Although broad 
philosophical issues are often involved, we will here attend to the narrower claims about 
potential productivity and performance benefits, and consequences in terms of between-
school segregation. These issues have been the prime focus of applied work in the 
education field. The arguments are fairly well rehearsed, and there are many theoretical 
expositions that focus on different aspects
2, but here we present a brief summary to 
motivate our empirical work. 
The starting point is two ‘ideal’ modes of school provision: 
1)  The community-school model, in which schools serve local communities 
only, and only those who live nearby or within the relevant jurisdiction 
are allowed in. 
2)  The parental-choice model, in which schools admit pupils regardless of 
where they live, and parental preference is the deciding factor. 
Broadly speaking, (1) has traditionally been the most dominant form of provision 
in most parts of the world. However, comparison of the relatively weak performance of 
state-sector schools operating under mode (1), with respect to schools in the private 
sector which operate largely on mode (2), has led many (following on from Friedman, 
1962) to advocate expansion of choice as the road to better schooling. Various 
                                                 
2 See, inter alia, Epple and Romano (1998), Epple, Newlon and Romano (2002), McMillan (2004) and 
Nechyba (2000, 2003). 
  3  efficiency and equity arguments impinge on discussions on the relative merits of each 
model. 
i) Efficiency arguments 
Advocates of mode (2) tend to base their claims on standard efficiency arguments 
from economic theory. These fall into two categories: those based on market discipline 
incentives, and those based on better matching of pupil needs and school provision. The 
main claims are predicated on the assumption that Tiebout choice, in which families 
vote with their feet and make residential and schooling choices simultaneously, has not 
led to an efficient allocation of resources under the community-based model (1). 
Indeed, community-based schools serving single neighbourhoods work in a 
relatively monopolistic market, and the incentives for improvement or adoption of new 
teaching technologies may be weak. Incentives need to come from good governance, 
supported by strong institutional arrangements including training, monitoring, 
mechanisms for self-evaluation and performance-related pay (or finance must be linked 
to housing demand); yet, these institutional arrangements may not be effective. 
Allowing parents free choice, instead, and linking school finance to school popularity, 
creates a direct market incentive mechanism: unpopular schools lose pupils and money; 
popular schools gain pupils additional funding; head-teachers/principals and staff are 
rewarded accordingly; schools must adapt to meet parental demands – which may 
include provision of high educational standards – or fail. 
Gains also arise through reallocation of pupils to schools according to personal 
preferences. Pupils find schools that better suit their tastes and pedagogic needs. 
Consider a move from a community-based to choice based system. If every pupil can 
find a school that they prefer at least as much as what was available under the old 
  4  system, the new system must be welfare improving. If every pupil can find a school that 
offers a teaching technology that educates them at least as effectively as under the 
community-based system, then academic achievements improve. 
Finally, greater choice could offer benefits particularly to people living in poorer 
communities, where children end up at schools that do not appear to offer educational 
standards or social environment that they find acceptable.  
In defence of mode (1) it is arguable that teaching proceeds better in a stable 
environment, where teachers are not under undue competitive pressures. Also, classes in 
a choice-based system may suffer higher pupil turnover linked to search, which can 
further disrupt teaching (Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin, 2004). Schools facing demand 
from families with heterogeneous preferences over school quality may even respond to 
an increase in competition by reducing costly effort and going down-market to serve 
those with weak preferences for school performance (McMillan, 2004). Finally, a 
further disadvantage of the choice based system is that on aggregate, pupil travel 
distances must be greater than (or equal to) those under the community school model. 
This may have direct effect on attainments because of lateness or stress, but alongside 
also come higher environmental costs from more car journeys and greater road 
congestion. 
ii) Equity arguments 
By tradition, critics of mode (2) have argued that it leads to segregation in 
schools, and inequitable outcomes. Yet, under mode (1), differences in community 
composition lead directly to disparities in terms of abilities and attitudes of their pupils, 
and resources at their disposal (in the widest sense, including funding and ‘social 
capital’). Under such conditions, the outcomes of community-based systems can be 
  5  highly inequitable, since pupils in poor areas have a higher likelihood of attending 
schools with poor educational outcomes and harsh social environments, than pupils 
living in wealthier areas. Furthermore, parents who cannot exit unpopular schools via 
the admission system can exit the community by moving home, leading to further 
community stratification through house prices (Black, 1999; Gibbons and Machin, 
2003, 2004). 
Greater choice (conditional on residential location) could break the link between 
school and community segregation and replace it with sorting across schools along 
those dimensions of family background which are correlated with more effective 
exercise of choice. Whether the outcome of a move from community-based to choice-
based is better or worse in terms of equity is thus an empirical question, and depends on 
how segregated communities initially are. 
Supporters of the community model (1) would argue that it is better to keep the 
admission system linked to residential location, and to ‘level the playing field’ by 
appropriate resource based policy. Unfortunately, the search for evidence on resource 
impacts has not unearthed many treasures in terms of effective policy (see Hanushek, 
2003). 
An overarching concern about wider school choice (model (2)) is, then, that even 
if choice itself, or the competition it engenders, have the potential to boost pupil 
achievements, these gains may not be equally distributed. Indeed, whether there are 
improvements on average depends whether the gains to the winners outweigh the costs 
to those who lose out. Hoxby (2003) argues that school competition is a ‘tide to lift all 
boats’, but as we next discuss the general weight of evidence in the literature (and the 
evidence we present below) suggests this to be rather bold a claim. 
  6  2.2 Previous research 
A lot has been written about school choice and competition in the past few decades. 
Over the years, various countries have adapted their institutional arrangements to 
accommodate greater freedom of choice for families, and, implicitly at least, greater 
competition between schools. The literature is rich in descriptions of these institutional 
arrangements and, sometimes, changes in aggregate achievements that accompanied 
them (e.g. Plank and Sykes, 2003; Gorard, Taylor and Fitz, 2003). The topic has also 
fostered considerable illuminating philosophical discussion (Brighouse, 2000) and 
political debate. In fact, following different approaches, a substantial volume of 
quantitative evidence on the effects of school choice on pupil outcomes has been 
produced (particularly for the US setting); Belfield and Levin (2003) provide a broad 
survey.  
The first and most common approach is to explore the effects of implicit variation 
in the level of choice available in different school markets (e.g. some of the work 
reviewed in Belfield and Levin, 2003, Hoxby, 2000, and Rothstein, 2004, for recent 
examples). These studies start by categorizing schools according to some indicator of 
market competitiveness, and then measure to what extent this indicator is associated 
with pupil outcomes in the cross-section. The first empirical problem, and one to which 
we will return later, is the definition of the competition indicator. In most research, the 
market in which a school is located is defined by the admissions district in which it is 
located, whilst the level of competition is based on the number of schools that seem to 
be available to any pupil in that district. Studies adopting this approach are mixed in 
their findings. Belfield and Levin (2003) suggest ‘the gains from competition are 
modest in scope with respect to realistic changes in levels of competition’ and that 
  7  many results are statistically insignificant. Hoxby (2000) does find that pupils perform 
better in metropolitan areas where there seem to be more schooling choices, though only 
once the number of school districts is predicted from information on the number of 
natural boundaries (rivers and streams) whereas least squares estimates are near zero 
and insignificant. Also, the validity of these instruments and the robustness of Hoxby’s 
results have been contested (Rothstein, 2005). 
A second approach evaluates the effects of private schooling; this has two strands. 
One body of work looks at the outcome of private sector pupils relative to public (state) 
schooling, or more specifically at whether pupils offered vouchers for access to the 
private sector perform better (Rouse, 1998; Mizala and Romaguera, 2005). In reality, 
this strand is not directly assessing whether increased choice or competition itself is 
effective at raising standards; the question is whether schooling in the private sector 
offers advantages over schooling in the state sector.
3 If it does, then giving families 
more freedom to choose private schools (by vouchers or similar schemes) could lead to 
aggregate improvements in educational standards.
4 A second strand looks at the 
competition effects directly by measuring the effects of private school enrolment on 
state school performance, on the basis that private schools provide competition for state 
schools (Hoxby, 1994, 2004a). This strategy is fraught with difficulty since the location 
of private schools is endogenous to neighbourhood status, and such schools are likely to 
skim off the higher-achievement pupils from the state sector (Epple and Romano, 
1998). 
                                                 
3 See some of the arguments in Nechyba (2005), who provides a theoretical overview of issues related to 
bringing aspects of the private sector to the state sector. 
4 The assumption is that private schools are competitive, and that this is the source of their technological 
advantage. 
  8  Finally, another body of research evaluates the impact of policy changes 
introducing greater competition or choice into geographically localised educational 
markets. In some cases, policies allow constructing research designs that directly exploit 
random assignment to choice programs: Cullen et al (2003) find that students 
randomized into supposedly better high-schools experience little academic benefit. On 
the other hand, Hoxby’s work (Hoxby and Rockoff, 2004; Hoxby; 2003) invariably 
finds benefits from choice-increasing programs, as do Holmes et al (2003) on school 
choice in North Carolina, and Lavy (2005) on choice in school districts in Tel Aviv. The 
findings from this strand of literature are often difficult to generalize, given the highly 
localized and peculiar settings under analysis. 
All in all, then, it has to be said that the evidence from the US is voluminous but 
‘mixed’; in contrast, evidence for Britain is almost non-existent. On the one hand, 
Levacic (2004) finds that secondary school head-teachers’ of self-reports of perceived 
competition are linked to school performance indicators. This probably means that the 
best headteachers are more aware of their competitors, since her structural measures of 
competition are unrelated to academic performance. Similarly, Bradley et al. (2000) 
show a number of ‘market’ type effects in secondary education following admissions 
reforms in the late 1980s – for example, schools that performed better than their 
neighbours attracted more pupils. Finally, Bradley et al (2001) find further that schools 
with close neighbours are more efficient in their use of resources. On the other hand, 
Clark (2005) reports that reforms that handed more power to schools (in late 1980s) 
only exerted modest efficiency gains through competition effects. Otherwise, most 
research effort has been directed at the effects on segregation (e.g. Gorard, Taylor and 
  9  Fitz, 2003, Goldstein and Noden, 2003, and Burgess et al, 2004), which we do not 
pursue here.  
The empirical work we present below is, then, to our knowledge the first pupil-
level analysis of the effects of choice and competition on academic achievement in 
primary schools in England, and the first anywhere that distinguishes these two 
concepts empirically. Also, our analysis is based on a large pupil census for a wide 
portion of South-England, and is therefore generally representative. Finally, exploiting 
some institutional features of school admissions across school district boundaries, we 
devise a solid instrumental variable (IV) strategy; this helps us solving some of the 
problems associated with previous IV studies and contested in Rothstein (2005). 
 
2.3 Primary school choice in the English context 
The current state-school system in England is something of a hybrid of a community-
based model and a parental-choice setting (i.e., models (1) and (2) discussed above). 
Traditionally neighbourhood-based, the principle of choice has been extended to a 
greater or lesser extent in different areas, since the Education Reform Act of 1988 (see 
e.g. Glennester, 1991). The trend has continued, with further expansion of choice being 
advocated in many quarters. 
Although choice in secondary education tend to dominate the political rhetoric 
and policy discussion, in this paper we will consider the effects of choice at the primary 
phase.
5 The reasons for this are two-fold. Firstly, we believe that choices made at 
primary age are critical for later educational success (see evidence in Heckman, 2000, 
                                                 
5 The UK Labour party, for example, has proposals to make all secondary schools ‘Specialist’ schools 
with their own curriculum specialisations and to allow popular schools to expand in response to demand 
(Labour Party 2005b). 
  10  and Dearden et al., 2004), and that parents are very active in exercising choice at the 
primary level (as evidenced by our other research on the house price effects of primary 
school performance in Gibbons and Machin, 2003, 2004). For this reason, empirical 
analysis of the impacts of choice and competition on the performance of under-11s is a 
valuable goal. Next, travel distances have a greater role to play in primary school choice 
because children of this age are not independent travellers. This means that 
geographical criteria are likely to be much more relevant in deciding which school to 
attend, so that the availability of schools can be more confidently inferred from 
geographical measures of accessibility. 
As to the actual extent of actual competition faced by primary schools (or the 
dimensions over which families can exercise choice), it is important to notice that 
primary schools are universally non-selective, do not have explicit curriculum 
specialisations, and are mixed gender; yet, primary institutions are funded according to 
pupil numbers, like secondary schools, and face therefore similar incentives in terms of 
their drives to attract pupils by improving educational standards. Moreover, from the 
perspective of choice and competition, important differences between schools arise, 
because of the way schools are governed and pupil admissions are controlled. 
There are three main groups of schools as follows: 
i) ‘Community’ schools: Most of the 14500 (or so) primary schools in England are 
classified as ‘Community’ schools; these are funded through the Local Education 
Authority (LEA) and admissions arrangements are administered centrally by LEAs. 
This type of school has no designated religious affiliation, and comprises around 60% 
of the total number of primary schools.  
  11  ii) ‘Voluntary Controlled’ schools: A further 15% are ‘Voluntary Controlled’; these are 
predominantly faith schools, usually linked to local churches (mostly Church of 
England, 96%), but staff are employed by the LEA, which also controls admissions 
arrangements.  
iii) ‘Voluntary Aided’ (23%) and ‘Foundation’ schools (2%): these have more 
autonomy and are run by religious or other charitable foundations, which own the 
school buildings. Their governing bodies include members of the foundation, employ 
the school staff and control school admissions. Although there are minor distinctions in 
funding arrangements between ‘Voluntary Aided’ and ‘Foundation’ schools, the main 
difference is that the foundations that run most ‘Foundation’ schools (86%) are not 
connected to a church or other faith; this contrasts with figures for ‘Voluntary Aided’: 
50% of these are linked to the Church of England, and around 47% to the Catholic 
Church.
6  
Overall, all LEAs and schools must organise their admissions arrangements in 
accordance with the current Department of Education and Skills School Admissions 
Code of Practice, which is a statutory document under the 1998 Schools Standards and 
Framework Act. The Code of Practice reflects the requirements of this Act and the 
subsequent changes introduced by the Education Reform Act 2002. The guiding 
principle of this document is that parental choice should be the first consideration when 
ranking applications to a primary school; yet, if the number of applicants exceeds the 
number of available places, almost any criterion – which is not discriminatory, does not 
                                                 
6 In the geographical zone we study in this paper, there are slightly more Community schools (66%) and 
Voluntary Aided schools (27%), but the latter are split between Church of England and Catholic in the 
same proportion as they are nationally. 
 
  12  involve selection by ability and can be clearly assessed by parents – can be used to 
prioritise applicants. LEAs now publish their admissions policy, complete with 
information on historical patterns of admission in each school in their jurisdiction (for 
example Barnet, 2005; Enfield, 2005); these admissions policies vary in detail, but 
preference is usually given first to children with special educational needs, next to 
children with siblings in the school and to those children who live closest, and possibly 
within some designated attendance zone. For faith-schools, instead, regular attendance 
at one or more designated local churches or other expression of religious commitment is 
foremost; how near or far away a pupil lives becomes important if there are too many 
applicants fulfilling the faith-related criteria. 
Finally, families are allowed to apply to schools in LEAs other than their LEA of 
residence. However, whereas at secondary school (post age-11) this process is 
formalised through a common application form to schools within and without the home 
LEA, at primary level parents must make separate applications to other LEAs; 
moreover, although LEAs are not allowed by law to prioritise residents of the 
authorities own administrative area over other applicants, LEAs do not have a statutory 
requirement to find a school for pupils from other LEAs and the law only require that 
they provide enough schools for pupils in their area.
7 As a result, banking on admission 
to a popular school in another LEA is a high-risk strategy, so cross-LEA attendance is 
not commonplace in ‘Community’ primary schools. In our study area in and around 
London only 4.7% of ‘Community’ school pupils, 3% of ‘Voluntary Controlled’ pupils 
                                                 
7 The Education Act 1996 section 14 reads: “(1)A local education authority shall secure that sufficient 
schools for providing (a) primary education, and  (b) education that is secondary education by virtue of 
section 2(2)(a), are available for their area. (2) The schools available for an area shall not be regarded as 
sufficient for the purposes of subsection (1) unless they are sufficient in number, character and equipment 
to provide for all pupils the opportunity of appropriate education” 
  13  and 6% of ‘Foundation’ school pupils attend outside their home LEA. For ‘Voluntary 
Aided’ schools that deal with their own admissions, LEA crossing is a little bit more 
common – at around 10% of pupils. 
In summary, exercise of choice takes place in three ways, and along the 
dimensions highlighted above. First, given residential location, a family can apply to 
local or more distant (secular primary) schools, but with a greater probability of 
admission to those close-by, and within the LEA of residence. Second, a family can, 
given their place of residence and religion commit to regular church attendance and 
apply to Church schools (rather than non-faith schools) almost anywhere within 
convenient travel distance, but again there is usually more chance of admission to local 
schools (and within LEA of residence). Otherwise, they can exercise Tiebout choice and 
move home, both within and across LEA boundaries. 
 
3  Empirical Methods 
 
3.1 Defining competition and choice competition 
The concept of competition we will invoke in this study is – like other work in the area 
– one of spatial competition. Schools compete with other schools for pupils in a 
community in order to maximise their revenues and minimise the costs associated with 
disruptive and hard-to-teach pupils.
8 However, a family’s choice of school is 
constrained by the distance between home and school, in part because of commuting 
                                                 
8 Schools in England are funded on a per-pupil basis (with adjustments for special needs and economic 
deprivation) but the marginal costs of teaching extra children within a class group are self-evidently small 
in purely financial terms. Schools are also evaluated on the basis of pupil pass rates in national tests (the 
league tables), which are heavily dependent on pupils’ initial attainments. For these reasons it is not hard 
to believe that these incentives are real. 
  14  costs, but more importantly because school admission rules have historically favoured 
residents who live nearby. Because of this, residential locations differ in terms of the 
number and accessibility of alternative schools, which in turn means that some schools 
face greater competition from alternatives than do others. Since state schools cannot 
easily change location or vary their price, they can only increase their market share by 
offering a higher quality product. These are the competition effects we seek out in this 
paper. 
Yet, the purpose of this empirical work is also to measure separate effects of 
greater freedom of school choice, and greater inter-school competition, on pupil 
performance. Though these two ideas are conceptually distinct, they can be difficult to 
separate. At the school level, these things go hand in hand. Markets in which parents 
have a wider choice of schools are markets in which schools face greater competition 
from other schools. But for the family, the two concepts of choice and school 
competition are distinct. Our definitions are as follows: Choice is a property of 
residential location, and is dependent on the number of alternative schools from which a 
family can choose. Competition is a property of school location, and depends on the 
number of alternatives available to potential pupils. 
One thing is clear at the outset: there must be variation in the competitive 
structure of school markets for either of these ideas to be meaningful empirically. Our 
empirical work considers a large metropolitan area in which there are few explicit 
differences in institutional arrangements that could give rise to different competitive 
structures; all LEAs offer broadly similar admissions arrangements, in line with the 
legal requirements of the 1988 Education Reform Act, the 1998 Schools Standard and 
Framework Act, the 2002 Education Act and the DfES codes of practice on schools 
  15  admissions.
9 Our claim is that it is the spatial arrangement of schools in relation to each 
other, and in relation to residential housing, to give rise to de-facto variation in market 
structure, because some families will find their homes geographically positioned to take 
advantage of a wider range of schools, whilst others will be much more constrained. For 
sure, this spatial arrangement may be endogenous to pupil performance and this is 
something we consider in our empirical work. 
 
3.2 Measuring choice and competition 
Our measurements of parental choice are based on the number of schools that, 
according to our data, are available to families living in a given location. Similarly, our 
measurements of competition are based on the range of alternatives that are available to 
pupils attending each school. Both of these measurements are based on the spatial 
configuration of schools and pupil residences. 
These kinds of competition/choice indices suffer from a number of problems. 
Firstly they can capture urban density and school size effects, rather than competition 
and choice; we try and carefully design the indices to avoid this. Secondly, different 
market configurations can arise through processes of parental choice and through 
endogenous school location. If school places are rationed by place of residence, then 
parents have good reason to move close to popular schools. These schools may appear 
monopolistic, even though it is parental choice that has compressed the geographical 
spread of their intake. Conversely, if motivated families with high-achieving children 
are more successful at exercising choice (conditional on residence), then successful 
                                                 
9 This is unlike the markets studied by Hoxby (2000), who considers the number of school attendance 
zones in a jurisdiction. 
  16  schools may appear competitive, even though it is parental/pupil choice that has spread 
their geographical intake. Finally, although new school opening and school closures are 
quite rare, it is not implausible that the current spatial distribution of schools is related 
to the socioeconomic characteristics of an area, and consequently, its pupil attainments. 
In particular, we suspect that faith schools may operate in places where economic and 
educational conditions are more favourable.
10 We address the endogeneity of the 
competition and choice indices induced by these factors using an instrumental variables 
approach based upon a boundary discontinuity, as described below (in Section 3.4) 
The indices we use are best described diagrammatically as in Figure 1 (although 
we define them more precisely below). Our data contains information on school 
location and pupil residential location, identified by 6 digit (1 metre) coordinates 
derived from full address postcodes. For each school s we define its travel zone to 
encompass all residential postcode units that are: a) within the same LEA as school s 
and b) contained within the perimeter of a circle drawn around school s at the median of 
the distribution of the home-school distances for pupils who attend school s.
11
Our index of school choice availability is derived using our knowledge of a 
pupil’s residential postcode and the travel zones of nearby schools. This index is 
defined as: the number of schools accessible to a pupil - the number of school travel 
zones that encompass the pupil’s residential postcode, excluding the school the pupil 
actually attends. 
                                                 
10 Yet, we have some mixed evidence on this point. For example, religious schools tend to locate in 
neighbourhoods where a lower fraction of individuals has low educational achievements; yet, they are 
also more likely to be in areas where a higher fraction of the population is on social rents. 
11 Using the median means that we are focussing on competition amongst the pupils who live nearest to 
schools. Our results are similar if we use a wider or narrower travel zone, e.g. the 25
th or 75
th percentiles. 
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attending school s, have or had the option of attending other schools.
 This information is 
obtained as: the average number of schools accessible to pupils in the school - the 
average of our school choice index across pupils attending school s. 
In all cases, when we consider pupil numbers, we count all pupils in the age 10-11 
cohort who are finishing primary school and taking their Key Stage 2 tests. 
Notice that we have experimented with a number of alternative competition 
measures, including number of schools accessible to pupils living in the travel zone, 
number of schools located within the travel zone, and number of schools within a fixed 
radius from the school; also, another commonly used measure is based on the 
Herfindahl index of pupil shares in alternative schools. These alternative indices all 
gave qualitatively similar result; yet, we think our number-of-school indices are 
conceptually better and easier to interpret. 
Importantly, the way we define the travel-zones used to construct these indices 
means that they are not purely dependent on school density, and hence on urbanisation 
effects. Even rural areas can (in principle) appear competitive, since our definition of 
school accessibility is based on observed pupil travel behaviour. Rural areas may 
exhibit low school density, but may still be competitive because rural pupils travel 
further to school. In a sense, our travel zones are defined by “revealed preferences”, as 
they are based on actual travel distances. This allows us to directly account for urban-
rural differentials, heterogeneous travel time, and other features of parental choice that 
would otherwise be obscured by imposing some homogeneous structure.
12
                                                 
12 Notice that our approach is almost identical to fixing a maximum time that parents/children spend 
travelling from home to school, and computing the number of available schools within this range. In fact, 
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Our focus is on the influence of these competition indices on pupil achievements, where 
these are measured in terms of standard test results. One can think of this as the effects 
of choice and/or competition on school productivity (Hoxby, 2003), though we make no 
attempt to evaluate achievements per pound spent.
13 As discussed above, more 
competition with other schools, and greater exercise of choice amongst its potential 
clients, may raise a school’s productivity because it forces schools to use a more 
efficient teaching technology, or because reallocation of pupils to schools results in 
more efficient pupil-school matches. From the pupil perspective, an extended choice set 
can only increase their personal achievements – conditional on the level of competition 
faced by the school they actually attend – if the availability of choice means that they 
were able to make a better choice of school. 
We look for these types of influence by estimating pupil-level educational 
production functions that use information for the London metropolitan area (described 
below). The data available to us is rich in geographical detail, with information on pupil 
residential addresses, which makes computation of these competition indices feasible. 
However, it is only available for two years to date, leaving us with little useful time-
series variation in the competition indices and forcing us to adopt an essentially cross-
sectional approach. 
The inputs into the education production functions include the choice and 
competition indices, alongside a wide range of pupil, school and/or neighbourhood 
characteristics. The full details of each specification are described in the Results section 
                                                                                                                                               
for a similar amount of time, we expect parents to cover more mileage in rural areas, and less in densely 
populated urban areas; this is precisely the kind of differences our indices are designed to solve. 
13 Expenditure information at school level is not available to us. 
  19  below. The outputs of the production function are measures of pupil attainment relating 
to standard tests taken at the end of the primary phase in English education, at age 
10/11. There is little doubt the outputs of a good education amount to more then good 
results in academic tests; but tests remain the simplest metric on which to judge pupil 
abilities, and average attainments in schools are the most common, if the most basic, 
means by which school performance is assessed. So, we use test scores as the main 
measure of pupil attainments, focussing on the gain in pupil attainments from age 6/7 to 
age 10/11: what is referred to as Key Stage 2 in the English National Curriculum. 
Summing up, all our empirical models are more or less restricted versions of the 
following specification: 
12 21 irst irst rt st irst KS KS c c α ββ ε ′ =+ + + + irst x γ   ( 1) 
 
where   is the age-10/11 test score for pupil i, who lives in postcode r and attends 
school s in year t;   is the age-6/7 test score for pupil i, who lives in postcode r and 
attends school s in year t; 
2irst KS
1irst KS
st c  is a competition index for school s in year t;   is a choice 
index for residents of postcode r in year t; and finally
rt c
′ irst x  is a vector of pupil, school, 
neighbourhood characteristics (and a year dummy). 
 
3.4 Accounting for residential sorting: instrumental variables strategy 
Families choose where to live, and schools are one thing they certainly consider when 
making that choice. As a consequence, the market structures we observe in our data – 
which are based on the spatial configuration of school and pupil residential locations – 
may be endogenous in the production of pupil achievements. This would be true if, for 
example, families crowd around a high-performing school, reducing its apparent 
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penetration by a specific type of school which tends to be high-performing. For 
example, faith schools are often considered high performers, and may induce 
competitive market structure. In fact, it is rare (and would suggest very inefficient 
planning) if non-denominational primary schools were located in close proximity; yet, it 
is common to find faith schools near non-denominational schools. Because of these 
concerns, we need to adopt and instrumental variable strategy and look for credible 
instruments for our competition and choice indices.  
In fact, our indices all assume that residence-school distance is an important factor 
in school choice because of travel costs. The general assumption is that the probability 
of family i attending school j is decreasing in the distance to the school dij. Given this, 
families are, under most conditions, more likely to choose their nearest school, as the 
average distance to alternatives increases (other things equal). To see this, consider the 
following simple exposition. Suppose family utility from attending school j depends on 
distance dij and the school quality qj, with uij = aqj - bdij. Family i attends the nearest 
school k if aqj – bdij < aqk - bdik for all j, or a(qj – qk) < b(dij - dik). Clearly, for given 
values of qj, qk and dik, the probability of i attending k increases as dij increases, for any 
j. An increase in dik  for any j implies an increase in the average distance to all 
alternatives to k (assuming the choice set is finite). 
Our instrumentation strategy uses this intuition, using the notion that families 
living near LEA boundaries face longer journeys to schools other than the nearest, than 
families living in locations interior to the LEA. The idea is best illustrated in Figure 3. 
The figure shows a linear district with 5 schools k, m, n, p, q spaced at equal intervals. 
Schools k and q are located at the district boundaries at the left and right ends of the 
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point i along the linear district. The bold line shows the average cost of reaching schools 
other than the nearest school, at any point i along the linear district. As can be seen, the 
average costs of travel to schools other than the nearest is higher for residents near the 
edge than the centre. This means that residents near boundaries are more likely to attend 
their local school, i.e. travel costs restrict choice for residents near the district boundary 
relative to those in the centre. A further implication is that probability that school j 
recruits from the set of families who have j as the nearest school decreases with the 
distance of j from the LEA boundary. From these arguments, we propose to use the 
distance between a pupil’s home and the LEA boundary as an instrument for school 
choice, and the distance between a school and the LEA boundary as an instrument for 
its level of competitiveness. 
These predictions clearly depend on the distribution of schools and families. They 
would not hold, for example, if schools and households were more densely distributed 
around the LEA perimeters than the centre. This is an empirical issue, which we 
investigate below, when we assess the validity of our instruments. A further assumption 
in using these LEA-boundary-distance instruments is that (as usual) they have no direct 
influence on school or pupil performance other than through their effects on the choice 




                                                 
14 Similarly, we are assuming that families do not decide to move away from LEA boundaries just 
because they value competition in itself (they just want a good school). Hence, from the parental 
perspective, there is no reason to reside far from LEA boundaries, unless this has a direct impact on 
pupils’ performance. This is however empirically rejected in our data (see the section on the instrument 
validity). 
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4.1 Data sources 
The empirical analysis employs a number of large and complex data sets, which we now 
describe. The central sources of data for the empirical analysis are the combined 
National Pupil Database (NPD) for 1996-2003, the Annual School Census (ASC) from 
1996 to 2003, and the Pupil Level Annual Census (PLASC) for 2002 and 2003. These 
are administrative datasets made available by the Department of Education and Skills 
(DfES) of the UK Government.  
The first (NPD) is a pupil-level dataset that records the test results obtained by 
pupils at various stages in their school careers. The first set of assessments is 
administered at age 6/7, at the end of what is called Key Stage 1 in the National 
Curriculum. The assessment comprises Reading, English and Maths tests and tasks. 
Pupils are awarded a ‘Level’ of 0,1,2,3 in each subject (with +/- subcategories), and 
these Levels can be translated into point scores according to some predetermined DfES 
rules. We refer to these as KS1 Point Scores. The second set of assessments takes place 
at age 10/11, at the end of ‘Key Stage 2’. The assessment comprises English, Maths and 
Science tests and pupils are awarded percentage marks in each of these (we call these 
the KS2 Test Marks). These marks translate into Key Stage 2 Levels 2,3,4,5 (with some 
+/- subcategories), which in turn translate into point scores, using standard DfES rules. 
We refer to these as KS2 Point Scores.
15 The basis for our composite dataset are pupils 
in PLASC who can be matched to pupils in the NPD taking Key Stage 2 tests in the 
                                                 
15 There are further post-primary education tests at age 13/14 (Key Stage 3), and General Certificate of 
Secondary Education academic qualifications at age 15/16 (Key Stage 4) but we do not use these since, as 
we have already noted, our spatial focus is much better suited to primary rather than secondary schools. 
  23  census years 2001/2002-2002/2003, and to their prior test results at Key Stage 1 in 
1997/1998 and 1998/1999.  
The second data set (ASC) collects information on pupil and teacher 
characteristics at school-level and is used for resource allocation and other 
administrative purposes by central government. It was augmented from 2002 on by 
PLASC, which collects characteristics of pupils individually, and provides a head-count 
of every pupil in schools on the census day (mid January). These pupil characteristics 
can be linked to the pupil test results in the NPD and to school characteristics in the 
ASC. Importantly for our work, we have access to the residential postcodes of pupils. 
All these pupil and school characteristics can be linked to additional school 
information, in particular school addresses and institution types using the DfES Record 
of Educational Establishments (‘REE’) and ‘Edubase’ files. Moreover, since we are 
going to compute measures of spatial competition using Euclidian distances, we need 
geographic coordinates for both schools and pupils; these are derived from the full 
address postcodes using Ordnance Survey Codepoint data, which provides 1 metre grid 
references for postcode unit centroids. For some of our analyses we also include 
information on pupil residential neighbourhood and family background. This is obtained 
by matching the residential address to GB Census data for 2001. Finally, we derive 
LEA boundaries from the County and District boundaries obtainable from the ‘UK 
Borders’ service for Geographical Information Systems. We shall exploit these in our 
instrumental variables approach. 
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As stated above, the pupil data we use relates to age-10/11 pupils sitting Key Stage 2 
tests in 2001/2-2002/3. The sample is further restricted to pupils living in a geographical 
zone within a 45km radius of central London, defined here as Bank tube station in the 
City of London, and to schools within the same radius.
16 Our purpose in restricting the 
data is to focus on primarily urban school markets. In very rural areas choice is often 
very limited, and we do not want to confuse urban-rural effects with those related to 
choice and competition. Reducing the sample also reduces the computational burden 
substantially. One further restriction is to eliminate partial LEAs (Luton, Bracknell) at 
the margins of our geographical zone, and in the City of London (which has a very low 
pupil population).  
 
5  Results 
 
5.1 Sample description 
Table 1 summarises the most important variables in the dataset, namely the pupil 
achievement indicators and competition/choice measures. The competition measures are 
defined above. Key Stage 2 Marks refer to test-specific percentage marks; Key Stage1-
Key Stage 2 Value Added refers to the difference between the total Key Stage 2 and 
Key Stage 1 point scores, and measures the pupil-specific gain in achievement in all 
subjects between age 6/7 and age 10/11. 
                                                 
16 We start with a sample within 50km in order to construct our choice and competition indices, but base 
estimation on the sub-sample within 45 km. This avoids us mistakenly inferring lack of competition, at 
the boundaries of our geographical zone.  
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measures. Clearly if all schools serve only the local community, or if any school within 
an LEA is easily accessible from any residence within an LEA, then there is no 
variation in the level of competition. In the first case, all schools are monopolistic for 
given spatial distribution of pupil residences. Our methods assume that a mix of 
neighbourhood-school and parental-choice structures exists, and that this will be 
reflected in our competition indices. Table 1 tabulates the summary statistics for our 
indices, Figure 3 graphs their distributions and Figures 4 to 6 provide maps (for part of 
our study area). These all show there to be substantial variation in the indices we have at 
hand. 
Row 1 of Table 1 shows that, on average, every 10 pupils could quite easily reach 
14 schools from their home address – in addition to the school they actually attend. 
Remember that this index is based on whether the median travel distance of pupils in 
neighbouring schools encompasses each home address, so that the feasible choice set 
could be quite a lot larger. This is our main measure of school choice availability. 
Averaging this choice index at the level of the school in which pupils are enrolled, we 
derive our competition index (Row 4, Table 1). The difference between the pupil and 
unweighted school mean implies that pupils in larger schools tend to be those with more 
choices. Looking at Figure 3, we see that around 1 in 4 pupils have no school (other 
than the one they attend) within a short travel distance, but only 1 in 10 schools have all 
pupils with no local alternatives. It is also worth noting that only 48% of ‘Community’ 
school pupils and 27% of faith school pupils in our study area actually attend their 
nearest school within their LEA, so there is clearly considerable exercise of choice (see 
also Burgess et al, 2004). However, distance is still an important factor: 56% of 
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school pupils attend their nearest faith school. 
From the maps of Figure 4-6 we can also deduce that the competition indices are 
only partly related to urban centrality and density: Some of the highest values of our 
index occur in suburban districts such as Barnet and Brent, whilst inner city zones like 
south Hackney or Southwark exhibit low levels of competition. Moreover, the patterns 
of competition induced by faith and non-faith schools are distinctly different. 
Further down Table 1 are other figures of interest. The median travel distance of 
primary school pupils in our study area is 743 metres, and this travel zone is home to an 
average of 80 pupils, though the number ranges widely from 2 up to 1015 metres. The 
average distance between a school and other schools in its travel zone is 203 metres, 
ranging from zero (i.e. two or more schools are in the same postcode) up to 3.5 km. We 
have also computed a cohort density measure centred on each pupil residential 
postcode, using a count of the number of pupils aged 10-11 within a 564m radius of 
each pupil address (a 1km
2  circle). The mean pupil density is 64.1km
-2, but ranges 
between 1 and 256. These two inter-school distance and population density variables do 
not feature in our competition or choice indices, but are used as controls for more 
general urban density factors in our regression models. 
In the next section we describe the results of these models. Note that we include a 
number of variables in these regressions, at four levels of aggregation: pupil level, 
school level, residential postcode and LEA level, in addition to the choice and 
competition variables in which we are interested. These variables are described in Table 
A1 in Appendix A. 
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Our first results are ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the model in Equation (1) 
and appear in Table 2. This shows the coefficients of interest only, and is divided into 
four panels. The top panel shows estimates of the association between choice 
availability and pupil attainments, unconditional on the index of competition at the 
pupil’s school ( 1 β  in Equation 1, with  2 β  restricted to zero). The next panel shows the 
association between school competition and pupil attainments ( 2 β  in Equation 1, with 
1 β  restricted to zero). The third panel reports the coefficients with both choice and 
competition indices included together ( 1 β  and 2 β unrestricted). The bottom panel reports 
auxiliary information in common to each of these three models. 
We consider three measures of pupil attainment: Column 1 reports results with 
percentiles of Key Stage 2 English test marks as the dependent variable, conditional on 
point scores in Key Stage 1 assessments but without any other control variables.
17 
Column 2 reports the same, but with the full set of controls described in Appendix A, 
Column 3 reports instrumental variables estimates which we discuss below. Columns 4-
6 repeat this sequence for Key Stage 2 Maths test marks, conditional on Key Stage 1 
point scores.
18 In Columns 7-9 the dependent variable is the pupil’s change in points in 
all subjects between Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 2, and is a direct measure of progress 
through the National Curriculum stages. 
                                                 
17 Controlling for prior achievements, or using achievement growth, risks underestimating the effect of 
fixed school characteristics, because prior achievement is determined by school characteristics too. 
Unfortunately the coefficient on prior achievement is also endogenous (see Todd and Wolpin, 2003) and 
downward biased. Nevertheless such specifications are commonplace and we follow tradition. Since we 
have no instruments for prior achievement which would allow us to correct the specification we simply 
note here that the coefficients on our competition and choice indices are almost unchanged if we use age-
11 test scores unconditional on age-7 test scores. 
18 We cannot repeat this exercise for KS2 test scores in Science as we lack prior KS1 controls since 
children are not tested in Science at age 6/7. 
  28  Looking at the OLS results in the first panel of Table 2, it seems clear that there is 
an association between the number of choices a pupil has available locally and their 
attainments at school between age 7 and 11. This is true, regardless of which attainment 
measure we use – though we find no statistically significant association with Maths 
until we properly control for pupil, school and area characteristics. However, the 
association is very small in magnitude: one extra school in the pupil choice set relates to 
a 0.2 percentile improvement in English and Maths, and a 0.1 value-added point. The 
results are qualitatively similar when we look at the school competition index on its 
own in the next panel. This is unsurprising, since the choice and competition indices are 
positively correlated. 
When the choice and competition indices are included together the picture is more 
mixed. According to the OLS estimates, pupils in schools facing more competition 
seem to do marginally better, unambiguously, but the impacts of pupil’s choice 
availability are more varied. Choice is not associated with better pupil performance for 
either Maths or Total Value Added, though pupils with more choices seem to do slightly 
better in English tests.
19
 
5.3 Instrumental variables estimates 
Taken at face value, these estimates suggest small but significant gains to pupils in 
schools facing more competitive markets. However, although the approach has 
similarities with previous cross-sectional research, we find it hard trust these as 
                                                 
19 We also assessed whether the impact of competition/choice mainly comes from under- or over-capacity 
schools. Our results suggest that: a - Competition always matters more than choice; b - Most of the action 
comes from schools that have a potential for expansion (under-capacity). This “threat effect” is in line 
with predictions from the empirical IO literature. 
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competitive pressures faced by primary schools. As discussed in Section 5.4, the choice 
and competition indices we use are quite likely to be endogenous to pupil and school 
performance. Firstly, the pupil travel patterns we use to calculate our indices of choice 
and competition may respond to differences in school quality that arise for reasons 
unrelated to competition and choice. Secondly, pupils with more choices available may 
concentrate in better-performing schools. Thirdly, pupil attainments may be correlated 
with competition structures because of unobserved family background characteristics, if 
for example, wealthy neighbourhoods contain a higher concentration and diversity of 
schools. 
To address these issues, we employ the Instrumental Variables strategy described 
in Section 3.4, using the residential distance from LEA admission district boundary as 
an instrument for choice, and the school distance from the LEA boundary as an 
instrument for competition. The coefficient estimates from this approach are in 
Columns (3), (6) and (9) of Table 2, and tell a very different story. The signs on all the 
coefficients become negative, but statistically insignificant: There is no evidence here to 
suggest that an increase in the number of schools available near a pupil’s home (as we 
move away from an LEA boundary) improves pupil attainments. Neither is there any 
evidence that attendance at a school that faces more competition further away from an 
LEA boundary improves attainments. These point estimates suggest that these changes 
could have small adverse effects on attainments, though they are imprecisely measured. 
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It is reasonable to ask whether, given these results, LEA boundary distance is really 
related to choice and competition. An important assumption for the instrument to 
determine choice and competition is that cross-LEA school attendance is not wide-
spread. In fact from Pupil Census data we have established that the proportion of entry-
age children (age-4) attending schools in an LEA outside their home LEA is only 
around 5.5%. This figure will include pupils whose family used to live within the school 
LEA and who have retained admissions rights through sibling rules. For Community 
schools, the figure is slightly lower at 4.7%.
20
Ultimately, the deciding factor is whether first stages in the IV regressions are 
effective. These are tabulated in Table 3. The instrument – the log of boundary distance 
– is always very powerful (a glance at the map of Figure 4 supports this). A 10% 
increase in the distance from LEA boundary to pupil residence increases the number of 
schools in the pupil’s choice set by 0.027, or about 2% relative to the mean 
(0.027/1.404). A 10% increase in LEA boundary-school distance increases the average 
number of alternative schools for pupils in that school by about 0.02. The instruments 
are individually significant and the F-statistic for the joint test of the instruments is 
always high (Staiger and Stock, 1997). In a nutshell, the instruments are indeed highly 
statistically significant predictors of choice availability and school competition. 
Further results (not tabulated) show that the instrument for choice also works in 
line with the theoretical reasoning we used to justify its use. Firstly, for each 1% 
                                                 
20 Moreover, well over 80% of the closest 10% of pupils to the LEA boundaries attend primary schools 
within their own LEA. This is particularly reassuring, as these pupils are typically in postcodes that are 
immediately adjacent to the boundary. LEA border crossing is a very unlikely event even in the closest 
proximity of an LEA boundary.  
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a 1.4 percentage point decrease in the probability that the pupil attends the nearest 
school (controlling for the average pupil-boundary distance within the LEA). Secondly, 
the average distance between a pupil’s residence and the nearest 4 schools (other than 
the one he or she actually attends) decreases by 0.06% for each 1% increase in the 
distance between their home and the boundary. In other words pupils near admissions 
district boundaries seem to be more constrained in their choice of school. 
Finally, we performed two sets of additional checks on our instrumental variable 
strategy. First, we dropped the restriction of no LEA crossing to compute our indices, 
and re-performed the IV analysis. First stage results show that distances to LEA 
boundaries are still strong predictor of competition and choice (results not tabulated); 
yet, we still find no causal impact of competition/choice on pupils’ outcomes. Next, we 
addressed the question of whether school or residence distance from LEA boundaries 
has a direct impact on pupil characteristics, and hence possibly on achievements. To do 
so, we regress the instruments against the exogenous variables in our models plus 
various population characteristics that we have not included in the main equations (from 
the 2001 British census or from our pupil data) and then test these for significance. The 
proportion of full-time employed, average pupil KS1 achievements, and most other 
local demographic measures are unrelated to LEA boundary distance (again we do not 
tabulate these). 
Everything here indicates that choice and competition in primary schooling (as we 
define them) increase as pupils and schools move away from LEA boundaries. 
However, from the results in Table 2 this has no systematic impact on pupil 
performance. The natural interpretation of this is that the positive, but small, association 
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is attributable to endogenous school location or pupil sorting. 
 
5.5 Faith schools and non-faith schools 
The difference between the OLS and IV estimates in Table 2 clearly warrants further 
exploration, and it is to this that we now turn. An important contributor to choice in 
primary school markets in England is the availability of faith schools – mostly Church 
of England (12.3% of pupils in our study area) and Catholic schools (11.1% of pupils in 
our study area) – which provide alternatives to the standard LEA ‘Community’ schools. 
Although these are still LEA funded schools, many have greater autonomy in terms of 
governance and admissions procedures and are a popular choice amongst families 
seeking high academic standards, good peer groups and a Christian (or other religious) 
ethos. Also, although the standard LEA ‘Community’ schools tend to be fairly regularly 
distributed over space, it is not uncommon for faith schools to be sited quite close to 
‘Community’ schools or close to other denominational schools. Faith schools increase 
the inequality in inter-school distances. As a simple illustration of this, consider the 
distribution of distances between nearest neighbour schools: the 90/10 percentile ratio 
for distances between LEA Community schools in our study area is 4.3, whilst the ratio 
goes up to 6.5 once faith schools are included. 
The importance of faith schools in our competition index is evident in Figure 6, 
which maps the mean number of faith schools accessible to pupils in each school 
(smoothed to give a local average suitable for mapping). The pattern is very similar to 
that in Figure 4, but quite dissimilar to the pattern of competition induced by non-faith 
Community schools in Figure 5. 
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estimates on our competition index, either because faith schools tend to be located in 
neighbourhoods with more motivated pupils and more favourable family backgrounds, 
or because pupils with a number of accessible faith schools near their homes become 
concentrated in those that offer better performance. Results in Table 4 are supportive of 
this interpretation. Here we split choice and competition indices to measure the number 
of faith and non-faith schools, and estimate pupil attainment regressions as before. It 
becomes quite clear, in Columns (1), (4) and (7) that it is the competition driven by 
neighbouring faith schools that generates the OLS results in Table 2. In fact we can 
eliminate the competition indices relating to the availability of non-faith schools without 
much influence on the results (Columns (2), (5) and (8)). Yet again, once we instrument 
faith school induced competition measures with distance-to-LEA-boundaries, we find 
negative, insignificant effects from competition. 
Delving deeper into the faith school issue, we next show that it is only for pupils 
in faith schools that there is an association between attainment and our competition 
index (either faith school or all-school based). Table 5 and 6 break down the results on 
the impact of faith school competition for the samples of pupils attending non-faith and 
faith schools respectively. In Table 5 (non-faith pupils) OLS coefficients are positive 
but statistically weak; the IV results are also statistically insignificant, but negative. It is 
for pupils in faith schools (Table 6) that OLS coefficients are positive and, for the 
competition index, statistically significant. And it is for these pupils that we find our 
first indication that exogenous changes in competition may matter for pupil attainments. 
The IV coefficients in Columns (2), (4), and (6) are large and positive, though still 
statistically weak. There is some indication here that pupils in faith schools benefit from 
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competition with a faith school raises pupil attainments by about 6 percentiles in 
English, by just over 2 percentiles in Maths and by 2 value added points overall. 
Importantly, these gains are concentrated on pupils in schools with higher-
proportions of children from poorer backgrounds and entitled to Free-School-Meals. 
Table 7 reports the results on Value Added points, split by High/Low Free-School Meal 
intake (above and below median proportions). The positive and significant coefficients 
on competition are concentrated in the poor-school group. The IV results too are 
significant, indicating that pupils perform better in high-competition faith schools 
further away from LEA boundaries. These results are consistent with US findings on 
Catholic schools reported in Neal (1997), Grogger and Neal (2000) and Altonji, Elder 
and Taber (2005). These authors suggest that urban disadvantaged pupils may benefit 
more from faith schools primarily, because their local communities offer poor state 
school alternatives. 
It is possible to further unpack these estimates of religious school competition by 
considering denominational differences – principally Catholic versus Church of 
England, since these are the main categories in our data. Table 8 presents some 
estimates that show how achievements of pupils in Church of England Schools and 
Catholic Schools varies in relation to the competition these schools face from other 
Church of England and Catholic Schools. In the OLS estimates, in Columns (1) and (4) 
we find that pupils in schools with higher competition indices show greater progress 
from Key Stage 1 to Key Stage 2. If these were truly competition effects, we would 
expect there to be little relationship between the ‘competition’ induced by Catholic 
schools for pupils of Church of England schools – and vice-versa – since these are 
  35  unlikely to be substitutes, unless pupils are prepared to convert from one Christian 
denomination to the other. However, this is not the case: pupils in a Church of England 
school appear to do better if its pupils face a wider choice of Catholic schools, and 
Catholic schools too seem to be more effective if facing competition from Church of 
England schools. Once more, OLS results do not seem very credible and we turn to an 
instrumental variables approach.  
Yet, it now becomes impossible to predict Catholic school competition from the 
school’s distance to LEA boundaries. In fact, it turns out that Catholic pupils tend to 
travel more widely across LEA boundaries; in all, 10.6% of age-4 pupils in Catholic 
schools attend schools outside their home LEA. Nevertheless, our IV strategy still 
works for Church of England schools; we therefore take a more limited view and only 
consider IV estimates for the impact of choice and competition from Church of England 
Schools (in Columns 3 and 4). The comparison OLS estimates are in Columns 2 and 
5.
21 The IV results now indicate that pupils in Church of England schools that face more 
competition from other Church of England have higher attainments relative to those in 
more isolated schools (which are closer to LEA boundaries). The impact is quite 
substantial: an additional school in the choice set of the pupil-intake adds 7 value-added 
points (nearly 1 standard deviation) to the change in pupil attainments between age 7 
and age 11. In comparison – as we would expect – the effect of Church of England 
schools on Catholic schools is small and statistically insignificant. These findings lend 
some support to a causal effect of competition on pupil achievement in this setting. 
                                                 
21 The estimates are consistent even if the variables for competition from and choice amongst Catholic 
schools rightly belongs in the equations, since both omitted variables are uncorrelated with the 
instruments.  
  36  6  Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper we have attempted to identify the causal links between choice and 
competition and the academic achievement of primary school pupils. To do so we have 
carefully constructed measures of the choices of primary school available to a pupil, 
based on the equilibrium accessibility of schools to their homes. From this, we also 
derived competition measures for the schools at which these pupils are enrolled. Choice 
and competition indices were related to pupil achievements in primary schools, first in a 
simple least squares setting and second using an instrumental variables approach based 
on a boundary discontinuity affecting school attendance. 
The results we report show a (small) least squares association that pupils tend to 
do better if they are enrolled in schools that serve more competitive markets. Yet, we 
found little evidence that it is competition that drives the gain in attainment; pupil 
sorting and endogenous school location provide more likely explanations for these 
findings. Once endogeneity issues are controlled for, attainments for pupils at 
Community schools – the standard state primary in the English system – are unrelated 
to the choices available to pupils or to the competitive pressures a school faces.  
It is only in faith schools – Church of England, and Catholic schools – that 
competition seems linked to performance, and then only in terms of their competitive 
position in relation to other faith schools. In terms of interpretation, we therefore do not 
rule out the possibility that faith schools respond to more to competition; in particular, 
Church of England schools seem to respond to competition from other Church of 
England Schools, but are insensitive to alternative Catholic choices. Given the evidence 
  37  at hand, we can only speculate that this is attributable to religious fervour or more 
proactive governance. 
These findings matter for the often heated debate about whether choice and 
competition are good things for pupil performance. There is some comfort here for 
advocates of choice and competition as a pathway to higher educational standards: we 
have found some evidence to suggest that competition may improve schooling for some 
of the 1 in 5 or so of the school population who attend religious primary schools. For 
the most part though, our results cast some doubt on general effectiveness of choice and 
competition in the school context. The results point to such pressures only operating in a 
specific sub-set of the primary school market. There are, of course, a number of other 
issues that could usefully be studied here. For example, we do not consider competition 
from private schools (largely for data reasons). Nor can we study parental preferences in 
any direct way. Building these factors into future work (theoretical and applied) would 
seem to be a useful direction in which to go. 
  38  References 
 
Altonji, J, T. Elder and C. Taber (2005), “Selection on Observed and Unobserved 
Variables: Assessing the Effectiveness of Catholic Schools”, Journal of Political 
Economy, 113(1), 151-84. 
 
Barnet (2005), “A Guide to Primary Education in Barnet”, London Borough of 
Barnet,  http://www.barnet.gov.uk/education/primary_schools/images/primary.pdf 
(accessed 25/4/2005). 
 
Belfield, C., and H. Levin (2003), “The Effects of Competition between Schools on 
Educational Outcomes: A review for the United States”, Review of Educational 
Research, 72(2), 279-341. 
 
Black, S. (1999), “Do Better Schools Matter? Parental Valuation of Elementary 
Education”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 578-599. 
 
Bradley, S., R. Crouchley, J. Millington, and J. Taylor (2000), “Testing for Quasi-
Market Forces in Secondary Education”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 
62(3), 357-90. 
 
Bradley, S., G. Johnes, and J. Millington (2001), “School choice, competition and 
the efficiency of secondary schools in England”, European Journal of Operational 
Research, 135, 545-568. 
 
Brighouse, H. (2000), School Choice and Social Justice, Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
 
Burgess, S., B. McConnell, C. Propper, and D. Wilson (2004), “Sorting and Choice 
in English Secondary Schools”, Centre for Market and Public Organisation Working 
Paper, 04/111. 
  39  Clark, D. (2005), “Politics, Markets and Schools: Quasi-Experimental Evidence on 
the Impact of Autonomy and Competition from a Truly Revolutionary UK Reform”, 
mimeo, University of California, Berkeley, US. 
 
Conservative Party (2005), “Educational Manifesto”. 
 
Cullen, J., B. Jacob and S. Levitt (2003), “The Effect of School Choice On Student 
Outcomes: Evidence From Randomized Lotteries”, NBER Working Paper, 10113. 
 
Dearden, L., L. McGranahan, and B. Sianesi (2004), “The Role of Credit 
Constraints in Educational Choices: Evidence from NCDS and BCS70”, Centre for the 
Economics of Education Working Paper, 48. 
 
Enfield (2005), “Primary School Admissions 2005”, Enfield School Admission 
Service,http://www.enfield.gov.uk/education%20and%20learning/School%20Admissio
ns/Primary%20School%20Admissions%202005.pdf (accessed 25/4/2005). 
 
Epple, D. and R. Romano (1998), “Competition between Public and Private 
Schools: Vouchers and Peer Effects“, American Economic Review, 88, 33-62. 
 
Epple, D., E. Newlon and R. Romano (2002), “Ability Tracking, School 
Competition, and the Distribution of Economic Benefits“, Journal of Public Economics, 
83, 1-48. 
 
Friedman, M. (1962), Capitalism and Freedom, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago.  
 
Gibbons, S. and S. Machin (2003) “Valuing English Primary Schools”, Journal of 
Urban Economics, 53, 197-219. 
 
Gibbons, S. and S. Machin (2004), “Paying for Primary Schools: Admissions 
Constraints, School Popularity or Congestion”, forthcoming Economic Journal. 
  40  Glennester, H. (1991), “Quasi-Markets for Education”, Economic Journal, 101, 
1268-76. 
 
Goldstein, H. and P. Noden (2003), “Modelling social segregation”, Oxford Review 
of Education, 29(2), 225-237 
 
Gorard, S., C. Taylor and J Fitz (2003), Schools, Markets and Choice Policies, 
RoutledgeFarmer, London. 
 
Grogger, J. and D. Neal (2000), "Further Evidence on the Effects of Catholic 
Secondary Schooling", Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs, 151-201. 
 
Hanushek, E. (2003), “The Failure of Input-based School Policies”, Economic 
Journal, 113, F64-98. 
 
Hanushek, E., J. F. Kain and S.G. Rivkin (2004), “Disruption versus Tiebout 
improvement: the costs and benefits of switching schools”, Journal of Public 
Economics, 88, 1721-1746 
 
Heckman, J. (2000), “Policies to Foster Human Capital”, Research in Economics, 
54, 3-56. 
 
Holmes, G. M., J. DeSimone and N.G. Rupp (2003), “Does School Choice Increase 
School Quality”, NBER Working Paper, 9683. 
 
Hoxby, C. (1994), “Do Private School Provide Competition for Public Schools?”, 
NBER Working Paper, 4978. 
 
Hoxby, C. (2000), “Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and 
Taxpayers?”, American Economic Review, 90(5), 1209-38. 
  41  Hoxby, C. (2003), “School Choice and School Productivity (Or, Could School 
Choice be a Rising Tide that Lifts All Boats?)”, in C. Hoxby, ed. The Economics of 
School Choice, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Hoxby, C. (2004a), “School Choice and School Competition: Evidence from the 
United States”, Swedish Economic Policy Review, 10(2). 
 
Hoxby, C., and J. Rockoff (2004b), “The Impact of Charter Schools on Student 
Achievement”, HIER Working Paper. 
 
Lavy, V. (2005), “From Forced Bussing to Free Choice in Public Schools: 
Individual and General Equilibrium Effects”, mimeo, Hebrew University, Israel. 
 
Le Grand ,J. (1991), Equity and choice. London, Harper Collins. 
    
Le Grand ,J. (1993), Quasi-markets and social policy. London, Macmillan. 
  
Labour Party (2005a), “Labour Party Election Manifesto”. 
  
Labour Party (2005b), “Schools forward not backward”, Labour Party Policy 
Document. 
 
Levacic, R. (2004), “Competition and the Performance of English Secondary 
Schools: Further Evidence”, Education Economics, 12(2), 177-93. 
 
Machin, S. and A. Vignoles (2005), What’s the Good of Education?, Princeton 
University Press. 
 
McMillan, R. (2000), “Competition, Parental Involvement and Public School 
Performance”, National Tax Association Proceedings, 150-55. 
  42  McMillan, R. (2004), “Competition, Incentives and Public School Productivity”, 
Journal of Public Economics, 88, 1871-1892. 
 
Mizala, A. and P. Romaguera (2000), “School Performance and Choice: The 
Chilean Experience”, Journal of Human Resources, 35, 392-417. 
 
Neal, D. (1997), "The Effects of Catholic Secondary Schooling on Educational 
Achievements", Journal of Labor Economics, 15(1), 98-123. 
 
Nechyba, T. (2000), “Mobility, Targeting and Private School Vouchers“, American 
Economic Review, 90, 130-46. 
 
Nechyba, T. (2003), “School Finance, Spatial Income Segregation and the Nature 
of Communities“, Journal of Urban Economics, 54, 61-88. 
 
Nechyba, T. (2005), “Mobilizing the Private Sector:  A Theoretical Overview’, 
paper presented at PEPG conference “Mobilizing the Private Sector for Public 
Education”, Harvard, October 2005. 
 
Plank, D. and Sykes, G., eds. (2003), Choosing Choice: School Choice in 
International Perspective, Teachers College Press, Columbia University, New York. 
 
Rothstein, J. (2004), “Good Principals or Good Peers? Parental Valuation of 
School Characteristics, Tiebout Equilibrium, and the Incentive Effects of Competition 
among Jurisdictions”, NBER Working Paper, 10666. 
 
Rouse, C. (1998), "Private School Vouchers and Student Achievement: An 
Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program", Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 113, 553-602. 
 
Rothstein, J. (2005), “Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students 
and Taxpayers? A Comment on Hoxby (2000)”, NBER Working Paper, 11215. 
  43  Staiger, D. and J.H. Stock (1997), “Instrumental Variable Regression with Weak 
Instruments”, Econometrica, 65(3) 555-586. 
 
Todd, P.E. and K. Wolpin (2003), “On The Specification and Estimation of The 
Production Function for Cognitive Achievement”, Economic Journal, 113(485) 3-33.




Number of schools 
accessible to pupils: 
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Figure 2: Illustration of the instrumentation strategy 
Figure shows a linear district with 5 schools, k,m,n,p,q; dij is the distance to each school;
i d  is the average distance to schools other than the nearest 
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Figure 3: Distributions of the choice and competition indices  
Figure 4: Primary School Competition in the Greater London Area 
Figure shows local averages of the school-level competition index (Inverse Distance Weighted means of the nearest 6 schools on a 250m raster). 





Figure 5: Non-Faith Primary School Competition in the Greater London Area 
Figure shows local averages of the school-level competition index (Inverse Distance Weighted means of the nearest 6 schools on a 250m raster). 





Figure 6: Faith Primary School Competition in the Greater London Area 
Figure shows local averages of the school-level faith-school competition index (Inverse Distance Weighted means of the nearest 6 schools on a 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Competition and attainments, summary statistics 
 
  Variable  Observations  Mean    Std. Dev.  Min , Max 
        
Number of schools accessible to pupil  201034  1.40  1.21  0, 10 
  Number of religious schools accessible to pupil  201034  0.78  0.88  0, 7 
  Number of non-religious schools accessible to pupil  201034  0.62  0.74  0, 5 
Average number of schools accessible to pupils in school  201034  1.31  0.99  0, 8.31 
Average number of religious schools accessible to pupils 
in school 
201034 0.79  0.77  0,  6.88 
Average number of non-religious schools accessible to 
pupils in school 
201034 0.52  0.53  0,  4 
Median travel distance all schools  201034  743.71  455.37  102, 6157 
Median travel distance, faith schools  48405  1084.24  612.25  146, 6157 
Median travel distance, non-faith schools  152629  635.72  325.28  102,5491 
Number of pupils in the travel area  201034  79.81  71.83  2, 1015 
Average school distance from competitors 201034  203.21  299.79  0,  3525 
Pupil Density (Number of pupils per hectare) 201034  0.64  0.37  0.01,  2.56 
KS2 test marks, English 196706  59.67  28.89  1,  100 
KS2 test marks, Maths 197829  50.64  28.89  1,  100 




Table 2: Primary School Competition and Pupil Attainments, Key Stage 2, 2001/2-2002/3 
  KS2 English percentile conditional on 
KS1 
KS2 Maths percentile, conditional on 
KS1 
Total Value Added Points 
                    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
                    OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
Choice index entered separately           




















           
           Competition index entered separately     
Average number of schools 



















           
          Competition and choice together 




















Average number of schools 



















           
                    Other  controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes






Maths           
                   
                   
Maths Maths None None None
Number  of  schools 2412 2412 2412 2412 2412 2412 2412 2412 2412
Observations 196706 196706 196706 197829 197829 197829 201034 201034 201034
Regression at the pupil level. Standard errors clustered on school: underline significant at 5%; bold underline significant at 1%; t statistics in parentheses.  
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Table 3: First Stage Results; Primary School Choice and 
Competition, and Distance to LEA Boundaries. 
  
   (1) English  (2) Maths  (2) Value Added 
Choice index entered separately          
Logarithm of Pupil Residence-















           
Competition indices entered 
separately 
        
















           
Competition and choice together          
Logarithm of School-LEA 







Logarithm of Pupil Residence-







           
Logarithm of School-LEA 







Logarithm of Pupil Residence-


















           
Other controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
KS1 controls  Writing 
Reading 
Maths None 
Number of schools  2412  2412  2412 
Observations 196706  197829  201034 
           
Regression at the pupil level. Standard errors clustered on school: underline significant at 
5%; bold underline significant at 1%; t statistics in parentheses. 





Table 4: Primary School Competition and Pupil Attainments, Key Stage 2, 2001/2-2002/3 
  KS2 English percentile conditional on 
KS1 
KS2 Maths percentile, conditional on 
KS1 
Total Value Added Points 
                    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
                    OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
           
N. of non-religious schools accessible 
to pupil’s home 
0.061 
(1.49) 
-               
               






Av. N. of non-religious schools 




























Av. N. of religious schools accessible 




















           
              Other controls  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes






Maths           
                   
                   
Maths Maths None None None
Number  of  schools 2412 2412 2412 2412 2412 2412 2412 2412 2412
Observations 196706 196706 196706 197829 197829 197829 201034 201034 201034
Regression at the pupil level. Standard errors clustered on school: underline significant at 5%; bold underline significant at 1%; t statistics in parentheses. 
Other controls are listed in Appendix A. Instruments in Columns (3) (6) and (9) are the log of the distance between school and LEA boundary and pupil home and LEA 
boundary 
 Table 5: Primary School Choice, Competition and Pupil Attainments, Key 
Stage 2, 2001/2-2002/3; Pupils in Non-Faith Schools 
  KS2 English percentile 
conditional on KS1 
KS2 Maths percentile, 
conditional on KS1 
Total Value Added Points 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS  IV OLS  IV OLS  IV 
          
N. of faith schools 













Av. N. of faith schools 














          
Other controls  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  No  No 




Maths Maths  None  None 
Number  of  schools  1689 1689 1689  1689  1689 1689 
Observations  148844 148844 149897  149897  152629  152629 
Regression at the pupil level. Standard errors clustered on school: underline significant at 5%; bold underline 
significant at 1%.; t statistics in parenthesis. The instrument for non-religious schools competition (or choice) 
measure is log of the distance between school (or pupil home) and LEA boundary, controlling for the average 
school-LEA boundary (or pupil home-LEA boundary) distance. The number of churches within 2km from 
school, and within 1.5km from pupil home, are also added as an additional controls. 
 
Table 6: Primary School Choice, Competition and Pupil Attainments, Key 
Stage 2, 2001/2-2002/3; Pupils in Faith Schools Only 
  KS2 English percentile 
conditional on KS1 
KS2 Maths percentile, 
conditional on KS1 
Total Value Added Points 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS  IV OLS  IV OLS  IV 
          
Faith schools 













Av. N. of faith schools 














          
Other controls  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  No  No 




Maths Maths  None  None 
Number  of  schools  723 723 723  723  723 723 
Observations  47862 47862 47932  47932  48405 48405 
Regression at the pupil level. Standard errors clustered on school: underline significant at 5%; bold underline 
significant at 1%.; t statistics in parentheses. The instrument for non-religious schools competition (or choice) 
measure is log of the distance between school (or pupil home) and LEA boundary, controlling for the average 
school-LEA boundary (or pupil home-LEA boundary) distance. The number of churches within 2km from 
school, and within 1.5km from pupil home, are also added as an additional controls. 
 
  54  Table 7: Primary School Choice, Competition and Pupil Attainments, Key 
Stage 2, 2001/2-2002/3; Religious Schools by Intake Income 
  High free school meal entitlement  Low Free-school-meal 
entitlement 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
       










Av. N. of religious schools 













       
Other controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of schools  272  273  486  486 
Observations  15024 15024  33381 33381 
Regression at the pupil level. Standard errors clustered on school: underline significant at 5%; bold underline 
significant at 1%; t statistics in parentheses. The instrument for non-religious schools competition (or choice) 
measure is log of the distance between school (or pupil home) and LEA boundary, controlling for the average 
school-LEA boundary (or pupil home-LEA boundary) distance. The number of churches within 2km from 
school, and within 1.5km from pupil home, are also added as an additional controls. 
 
Table 8: Primary School Choice, Competition and Pupil Attainments, Key 
Stage 2, 2001/2-2002/3; Faith Schools and Church of England Competition 
  C of E  Catholic 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS OLS  IV OLS OLS  IV 
        
N. of C of E schools 













Av. N. of C of E 
schools accessible to 













N. of Catholic schools 
accessible to pupil 
0.175 
( 1.57) 
- -  0.181 
(1.22) 
- - 
Av. N. of Catholic 
schools accessible to 
pupils in school 
0.693 
(2.10) 
- -  1.177 
(2.17) 
- - 
        
Other controls  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number  of  schools  397 397 397 306 306 306 
Observations  24791 24791 24791 22274 22274 22274 
Regression at the pupil level. Standard errors clustered on school: underline significant at 5%; bold underline 
significant at 1%.; t statistics in parentheses. The instrument for non-religious schools competition (or choice) 
measure is log of the distance between school (or pupil home) and LEA boundary, controlling for the average 
school-LEA boundary (or pupil home-LEA boundary) distance. The number of churches within 2km from 
school, and within 1.5km from pupil home, is also added as an additional control, respectively in the competition 
and choice regressions (jointly when all indexes are simultaneously included). 
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Table A1: Controls, summary statistics 
 
  Variable  Observations  Mean    Std. Dev.  Min , Max 
 
Pupil Level Variables 
English as First Language  201034  0.795  0.403  0, 1 
Female 201034  0.497  0.500  0,  1 
Pupil with Special Needs, 
with and without statements (SEN) 
201034 0.245 0.430  0,  1 
Free School Meal Eligible (FSME)  201034  0.198  0.399  0, 1 
 
School Level Variables 
Pupil/Qualified Teacher Ratio 201034  23.641  3.936  11.2,  108.3 
Total School Size  201034  367.055  138.207  52, 1373 
Fraction of Pupils with SEN  201034  0.209  0.090  0, 0.652 
Fraction of Pupils with FSME  201034  0.163  0.135  0, 0.620 
 
Postcode Level Variables 
Fraction of Lone Parents  198688  0.274  0.174  0, 1 
Fraction of Unemployed   198688  0.039  0.026  0, 0.257 
Fraction With no School Qualifications 198688  0.272  0.106  0,  0.724 
Fraction with Black Ethnicity  198688  0.083   0.112  0, 0.725 
Fraction with Chinese Ethnicity  198688  0.018  0.023  0, 0.527 
Fraction with Other Asian Ethnicities  198688  0.099  0.148  0, 0.907 
 
LEA Level Controls 
Total LEA Expenditure in 2000 (in £1000)  201034  2170.823  1691.547  493 , 5983 
LEA Area (in 1,000,000 squared metres)  201034  680.349  1076.473  12, 3451 
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